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Abstract
This paper discusses the problem of monetary policy transparency in a
simple static robust control framework. In this framework, we identify two
sources of monetary policy uncertainty. First, we identify the uncertainty
about the central bank’s inﬂation stabilization preferences, which aﬀects the
private sector’s inﬂation expectations and therefore the realized inﬂation and
output. On the other hand, uncertainty means that central bank is unsure
about its model, in the sense that there is a group of approximate models
that it also considers as possibly true and its objective is to choose a rule
that will work under a range of diﬀerent model speciﬁcations. We ﬁnd that
robustness reveals the emergence of a precautionary behaviour of the central
bank in the case of unstructured model uncertainty, reducing thus central
bank’s willingness to choice a high degree of monetary policy transparency.
Keywords : central bank transparency, min-max policies, model uncer-
tainty, robust control.
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11 Introduction
Central bank transparency has become one of the main features of monetary policy-
making during the last decade. However, despite the recognized academic literature
on the central bank independence, research in favour of transparency of monetary
policy is relatively new ( Eijﬃnger, Hoeberichts and Shaling, 2000; Cukierman, 2001;
Geraats, 2002, 2004 and Demertzis and Hughes Hallet, 2003) and the ﬁndings of
the transparency literature seem to be not irrefutable. There appears also to be an
inconsistency between the eﬀects emphasized in the theoretical literature and the
motives for central bank transparency in practice (Geraats, 2002). Indeed, theo-
retical models show that transparency has the potential to reduce uncertainty and
to enhance the credibility of monetary policy. In addition, transparency may aﬀect
the incentives that policymakers face to manipulate private sector beliefs through
signaling and reputation building. In other words, when monetary policy decisions
are intended to oﬀset economic shocks, private information gives the central bank
greater ﬂexibility to stabilize the economy.
These theoretical considerations on central bank transparency often rely on un-
certainty eﬀects generated by asymmetric information and are likely to depend on
the speciﬁc context of uncertainty. Transparency refers to the absence of informa-
tion asymmetries between monetary policymakers and the private sector. Perfect
transparency corresponds to a situation of symmetric information. This does not
imply that monetary policymakers and the private sector have complete information
about the economy and economic disturbances. Thus, to understand the optimal
choice of the degree of transparency and his economic consequences, it is helpful to
look, ﬁrst, at the uncertainty generated by asymmetric information and second, at
the uncertainty about the true structure of the economy.
There is currently a wide consensus that, subject to the constraints inherent in
the structure of the economy, the central bank should minimize an appropriately
discounted value of expected losses where the period loss function is given by a
weighted average of the output and inﬂation deviations from their targets. Trans-
parency about the policy process aimed at achieving this objective requires clarity
about the structure of the economy (Cukierman, 2005). In this context, uncer-
tainty about the structure of the economy has some interesting implications for the
optimal transparency. However, in previous studies on central bank transparency,
policymakers are assumed to know the true model of the economy and observe accu-
rately all relevant macroeconomic variables. Uncertainty arises from the unknown
future realisations of the supply shocks, assumed to be modeled according to some
stochastic process whose properties is known. Unfortunately, the reality is much
more complex. The policymaker’s choice is made in the fare of tremendous uncer-
tainty about the true structure of the economy, the impact policy actions have on
the economy, and even about the current state of the economy. This complexity
means that a certain degree of subjectivity enters into the actual decision making
when deciding upon optimal monetary policy. In other words, the policymaker is
unsure about his model, in the sense that there is a group of approximate models
that he also considers as possibly true.
2This raises the question of how a monetary policy rule should be selected in the
face of uncertainty about the correct model of the economy. In fact, solutions to the
expected value problem by standard optimal control methods do not deliver the best
average performance if they are applied to an incorrect model. Because uncertainty
is pervasive, it is important to understand how alternative policies work when the
policymaker employs a model of the economy that is incorrect in unknown ways.
Therefore, the resulting problem is one of robust control, in the sense of Hansen
and Sargent (2003, 2004), where the objective is to choose a rule that will work
under a range of diﬀerent model speciﬁcations. The notion that policy decisions
may be more robust if based on systematically distorted model of the economy is a
key implication of the recent research on robustness control or uncertainty aversion
literature (Onatski and Williams, 2003; Kilponen, 2003; Giordani and S¨ oderlind,
2004; Leitemo and S¨ oderstr¨ om, 2004; Walsh, 2004).
This paper adapts robust control approach to the problem of the central bank
transparency in a simple one-period positive theory monetary policy framework
developed originally by Kydland and Prescott (1977) and Barro and Gordon (1983)
in order to illustrate the basic intuition behind this new approach to uncertainty.
In this framework, we identify two sources of uncertainty. First, the uncertainty
concerning the central bank preferences (lack of transparency) aﬀecting the private
sector inﬂation expectations and thus inﬂation and output and second, the model
uncertainty aﬀecting the macroeconomic variables and the degree of transparency.
In this context, it is particularly important to give an answer to the question whether
model uncertainty aﬀects the transparency of monetary policy as well as the welfare
and the macroeconomic performance.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 sets up a one-period
model of monetary policy. Section 3 derives the discretionary equilibrium under
robust control. Section 4 derives the link between robustness and the degree of
central bank transparency. Section 5 and 6 derives the macroeconomic performance
and the welfare eﬀects of central bank transparency. Section 7 summarises the main
conclusions.
2 The model
In this section, we apply the basic idea of robust control to a simple one-period
model of monetary policy developed originally in the seminal papers of Kydland and
Prescott (1977) and Barro and Gordon (1983), in which policymaker sets inﬂation
according to the following aggregate supply function:
x = π − π
e + ǫ + h (1)
where x ≡ y − y∗ is the output gap between the real aggregate output y and the
natural rate of output y∗ > 0, π is the inﬂation rate, πe is the rationally expected
inﬂation rate, ǫ is a random variable with mean zero and variance 1, and h is an
additional deterministic disturbance component which introduce ambiguity of the
3model. The two disturbances terms and have diﬀerent properties. The term ǫ is
assumed to be a random error with a prior known stochastic properties, whilst
h represents in the spirit of robust control (Hansen and Sargent, 2004) a totally
ambiguous model misspeciﬁcation error, in the sense that the policymaker is not
able to assign any prior probability distribution to h. The model with h = 0
represents the reference model, while the models with h  = 0 represent candidate
models surrounding the reference model. The size of the distortion term h must
be bounded as the policymaker has some information on the process. Hence, we




where the parameter η2 bounds the square of the government’s speciﬁcation error h2.
Restriction (2), together with equation (1), deﬁne a set of models that the central
bank considers as being possible outcomes in the sense that the policymaker does
not know exactly the position of the aggregate supply in the space (x, π).
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2 + λ(π −   π)
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(3)
where central bank is assumed to stabilize output y and inﬂation π around their
target values   x > 0 and   π, which is for simplicity ﬁxed to zero. λ > 0 is the inﬂation
aversion parameter of the central bank.
The issue of transparency arises when the public’s perception about the bank’s
preferences on inﬂation ¯ λ diﬀers from the values that the bank itself actually con-
siders λ1. Equation 4 speciﬁes the stochastic behavior of the parameter λ as fol-
lows:
λ = ¯ λ −  , with Et−1 ( ) = 0 , Var( ) = σ
2
µ (4)
This implies that the public is correct on average, but may be mistaken when making
guesses about the central bank preferences in individual cases or at certain points in
time. σ2
µ measures the degree of opacity of the central bank’s inﬂation stabilization
preferences. If the variance of the preference shock σ2
µ goes up (goes down), the
central bank becomes less(more) transparent respectively.
3 Discretionary equilibrium
According to the robust control approach, in order to hedge against the model
ambiguity, the policymaker makes a particular subjective assessment of h . In
other words, he chooses the worst case (h  = 0) at any given πe and then designs
corresponding monetary policy rule π which maximizes the utility at given h. In
1In the transparency literature, misunderstandings about the true value of the preference pa-
rameters λ can be identiﬁed as political transparency in line with Hughes Hallet and Viegi (2001)
or Geraats (2002).
4order to introduce such subjective assessment of h into the decision making problem,
we replace the standard quadratic utility function (4) by an “uncertainty aversion”
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The design of a robust policy rule becomes now a min-max problem, where the
optimal level of inﬂation is found by minimizing L′
cb , with h being chosen to maxi-
mize L′
cb subject to the linear constraint (1). θ is a ﬁxed penalty parameter which
reﬂects the central banker’s desired degree of robustness. θ > 1 can be interpreted
as a Lagrangian multiplier on constraint (2). The value θ = 1 is the breakdown
point to be discussed later. The value for θ would be endogenous in the constrained
Lagrangian, and it would be associated to the speciﬁc η value used in the constraint
(2). The way the problem is written here, θ is chosen directly and the constraint is
adapted accordingly. Note also that larger values of θ imply smaller sets of models
so that θ is an indicator of the precautionary behaviour of the authorities. In other
words, the more θ is close to one, the more the central bank is insuring about the
accuracy of the model it uses. In the opposite case, as θ → +∞, the central bank
believes that its model is a good approximation of the true model of the economy.
In the limit case where θ = +∞, there is no misspeciﬁcation and the central bank
is convinced that the model it uses is the true one.
From the ﬁrst order conditions for π and h in the problem (5), we obtain respec-
tively the following solutions for the central bank robust policy rule and the nature
(evil agent) worts-case shock :
π(h) =




π − πe + ε −   x
θ − 1
(7)
and then solving the system of equations (6) and (7), we obtain:
π(θ) =
θ
θ + λ(θ − 1)
(π
e − ε +   x) (8)
h(θ) = −
λ
θ + λ(θ − 1)
(π
e − ε +   x) (9)
where π(θ) gives the central bank’s (robust) best reaction function for setting π as a
function of πe, while h(θ) determines the worst case model, given πe and the central
bank’s setting π(θ). Then, using equation (8) and assuming rational expectations




θ + λ(θ − 1)
 
(π
e +   x) (10)




θ + ¯ λ(θ − 1)
 2 + (θ − 1)σ2
µ
 
θ + ¯ λ(θ − 1)
 2  ¯ λ(θ − 1)
 
− θ(θ − 1)2σ2
µ
  x (11)
where the expected inﬂation is positive πe > 0 because there is a source of a positive
inﬂation bias in the model (  x > 0). Then, given (11), we can solve for the equilib-
rium. Inserting inﬂation expectations (11) into equations (8) and (9) and solving
the resulting system delivers the inﬂation, the output gap and the worst-case shock
in discretionary equilibrium as follows:
π =
θ
θ + λ(θ − 1)
   
θ + ¯ λ(θ − 1)
 3   x
 
θ + ¯ λ(θ − 1)





x =   x −
θλ
θ + λ(θ − 1)
   
θ + ¯ λ(θ − 1)
 3   x
 
θ + ¯ λ(θ − 1)







θ + λ(θ − 1)
   
θ + ¯ λ(θ − 1)
 3   x
 
θ + ¯ λ(θ − 1)





4 Robustness and transparency
In this model uncertainty framework, the robust policy rule is designed to perform
reasonably well across a range of alternative models, but it has not been designed
to be optimal relative to any particular model. In this context, it is particularly
important to give an answer to the question whether model uncertainty aﬀects the
transparency of monetary policy. In order to highlight this question, it is useful to
ﬁnd a relation between the degree of model robustness θ and the variance of the
central bank preference shock σ2
µ . For this reason, we use the expected inﬂation
equation (11), where πe > 0 because a positive inﬂation bias (  x > 0) is assumed in
this model. To be consistent with πe > 0, the condition
 
θ + ¯ λ(θ − 1)
 2  ¯ λ(θ − 1)
 









θ + ¯ λ(θ − 1)
 2 ¯ λ
θ(θ − 1)
(15)
This inequality (15) can be used to generate a link between the degree of model
robustness θ and the variance of the central bank preference shock σ2
µ. The intuition
behind this link is that there is an upper limit for the degree of central bank opacity
6(lack of transparency) σ2
µ , which is a function of the degree of model robustness θ.
In this perspective, we verify the monotonicity of the function
f(θ) =
 
θ + ¯ λ(θ − 1)
 2 ¯ λ
θ(θ − 1)
(16)
by taking the following ﬁrst order condition :
f
′ (θ) = −
 
θ + ¯ λ(θ − 1)
  
θ − ¯ λ(θ − 1)
 
θ2(θ − 1)2 (17)
Equation (17) reveals that monotonicity of f ′ (θ) depends crucially on the sign
of the term
 ¯ λ(θ − 1) − θ
 
. To provide a further clariﬁcation of the sign of this
term, we can determine the relation between the degree of model robustness and
the degree of central bank opacity. In this respect, the expression
 ¯ λ(θ − 1) − θ
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Figure 1: The monotonicity of
 
λ(θ − 1) − θ
 
where the curve in this ﬁgure represents all the points satisfying the condition:  ¯ λ(θ − 1) − θ
 
= 0 (with ¯ λ = 1 and θ = 1 being two asymptotes). Here, we just
take into account the region A delimited by ¯ λ ≥ 1 and θ > 1. Our discussion here
focuses solely on the region A which represents generally the most of possible cases
where an independent central bank has a rather high degree of model robustness.
It becomes also obvious that the area bordered by the above three lines is negligible
in the whole region A. For this region, we verify the following relation:
f
′ (θ) > 0 (18)
This result represents the more realistic condition on the current central banking
practice. In fact, the majority of central banks presently attach a more important
7weight to inﬂation stabilization than to the output gap. On the other hand, though
the central bank’s reference model could be misspeciﬁed to some extend, the extent
of speciﬁcation error is restricted (see equation 2), which implies that the degree of
model robustness θ is usually to a large extent higher than the break point 1. From
this result, we derive the following proposition.
Proposition 1 There are a positive relationship between the degree of model robust-
ness, θ, and the degree of central bank opacity (lack of transparency) σ2
µ. In other
words, the limits within which the central bank may assign alternative values in σ2
µ,
enlarge with the increase in the degree of model robustness, θ, meaning that central
bank’s monetary policy can be less transparent.
Proof. According to equation (18), we obtain the following result ∂f(θ)/∂θ > 0.
This result imply a less restrictive condition on σ2
µ according to equation σ2
µ < f(θ)
(15). This imply an enlargement of the limits within which the uncertainty of central
bank preferences, σ2
µ, may take higher values than before an increase in the degree
of model robustness, θ.
The intuition behind this result is that the less a central bank believes in the
robustness of the model of the economy, the more it could be reluctant to reveal
information on its preferences about inﬂation stabilization.
5 Macroeconomic eﬀects
The discretionary equilibrium solutions permit as to investigate now how the degree
of central bank opacity, σ2
µ, aﬀects the optimal values of the macroeconomic vari-
ables. Considering equations (19), (12) and (13), and diﬀerentiating with respect to
the degree of central bank opacity σ2
µ , we obtain respectively for expected inﬂation,










 ¯ λ(θ − 1)A2 − θ(θ − 1)2σ2
µ
 2 ˆ x +
θ(θ − 1)2
¯ λ(θ − 1)A2 − θ(θ − 1)2σ2
µ
ˆ x (19)





θ2(θ − 1)2A3ˆ x
(λ(θ − 1) + θ)
 
A2¯ λ(θ − 1) − (θ − 1)2θσ2
µ
 2 (20)




λθ2(θ − 1)2A3ˆ x
(λ(θ − 1) + θ)
 
A2¯ λ(θ − 1) − (θ − 1)2θσ2
µ
 2 (21)
From the above results, we derive the following propositions concerning the eﬀects
of transparency on macro variables.
Proposition 2 The more the central bank’s opacity σ2
µ is important, the higher the
inﬂation expectations πe, the inﬂation π and the output gap x will be.













The intuition behind this proposition is that as the central bank opacity about its
preferences increases, private agents tend to move up their inﬂationary expectations
because of the risk to underestimate the inﬂation. On the other hand, to realize the
output objective, central bank should raise more the inﬂation rate subsequent to the
move up of the inﬂationary expectations. Consequently, the level of the output gap
will be higher when the change on the central bank opacity (lack of transparency)
becomes more important.
Concerning now the inﬂation and output gap volatility due to the change on the
central bank transparency, equations (12) and (13) give as respectively the variances
of the inﬂation and the output gap as:2
Var(π) =
θ2(θ − 1)2


















Proposition 3 The more the central bank’s opacity σ2
µ is important, the more the
volatility of the output gap and the inﬂation will be important.








 ¯ λ(θ − 1) + θ
















Finally, we consider the interaction between the uncertainty about the central
bank preferences σ2
µ and the model uncertainty which is characterized by the mis-
speciﬁcation term h. We derive the following proposition.
Proposition 4 The misspeciﬁcation doubts of the central bank about the true struc-
ture of the economy, h , are positively related to the central bank’s opacity σ2
µ .






λθ(θ − 1)2A3ˆ x
(λ(θ − 1) + θ)
 
A2λ(θ − 1) − (θ − 1)2θσ2
µ
 2 > 0 (26)
2We assume here ˆ x = 0, for simplifying the calculate.
9The preceding results reveal that a larger degree of central bank opacity requires
that central bank will act more aggressively. This brings better economic stability
performance, but it does not come without costs. On the other hand, the possible
misspeciﬁcation doubts of the central bank will be negatively related to the monetary
policy transparency.
6 Welfare eﬀects
We consider in this section how the central bank’s expected loss function L′
cbvaries
with the degree of model robustness θ and the degree of central bank’s opacity σ2
µ.
In this respect we insert the equilibrium values of π, x and h in the central bank’s
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Taking into account that E (λ) = λ and σ2










θ + ¯ λ(θ − 1)
 6   x2
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 2 ¯ λ(θ − 1) − θ(θ − 1)2σ2
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We examine, ﬁrst, the impact of the uncertainty concerning the central bank’s opac-
ity on the central bank’s expected losses and we derive the following proposition.
Proposition 5 The greater the central bank opacity is, the higher the expected losses
of central bank will be.
Proof. From equation (28), we derive with respect to σ2






λθ2(θ − 1)2  
θ + ¯ λ(θ − 1)
 6   x2
[θ + λ(θ − 1)]
  
θ + ¯ λ(θ − 1)
 2 ¯ λ(θ − 1) − θ(θ − 1)2σ2
µ
 3 > 0 (29)
It is not surprising that this increase of uncertainty of the central bank prefer-
ences will induce a further higher loss. Indeed, as has been demonstrated in the
previous section, an increase of the uncertainty about the central bank’s preferences
generates a higher volatility of inﬂation and the output gap.
Finally, we consider the eﬀect of the model uncertainty on the central bank’s
expected loss function. Given the imprecise interaction between the of model uncer-
tainty, the central bank’s opacity and the central bank’s expected losses, we consider
10two particular cases. First, the case where there is no uncertainty on central bank’s
preferences, (i.e. the case of full transparency) and second, the case where there is
a certain degree of uncertainty on central bank’s preferences (i.e. relative opacity).
In the ﬁrst case, since σ2







  ¯ λθ
θ + ¯ λ(θ − 1)
+
Aθˆ x2
(θ − 1)2¯ λ
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 ¯ λ(θ − 1) + 2θ






Equation (31) reveals that the more the model is robust, the less the central bank
expected loss will be. This result is in line with the corresponding literature. More-
over, in the case where there is no model misspeciﬁcation (i.e.θ → ∞), the central
bank’s expected loss receives its minimum value (the certainty equivalence case).
However, it becomes more interesting to re-evaluate this relation in the sec-
ond case, in which opacity on the central bank preferences occurs. Unfortunately,
analytical derivation in this case for the expected loss function with respect to θ
is complicated. Nevertheless, using numerical simulations, we show that when the
model used by the central bank becomes more accurate, the central bank’s losses





















Figure 2: The central bank’s losses
In Figure 2 we report the results of our numerical simulations and we illustrate
a negative relationship between the degree of model robustness θ and the central
bank’s losses L′
cb. Finally, using the results of these two cases, we can derive the
following proposition:
11Proposition 6 For any given degree of transparency, the central bank’s expected
loss decreases with the degree of model robustness.
Proof. From equation (31) and the simulation results reported in Figure 2,
it is straightforward to ﬁnd that : ∂L′
cb/∂θ < 0
In this framework, the expected loss is aﬀected by two underlying sources of
uncertainty. For any given degree of central bank transparency, central bank can
always beneﬁt from the improvement of the model robustness improving thus the
macroeconomic performances.
7 Conclusions
In this paper, we adapt the robust control approach on uncertainty in a simple static
one-period monetary policy game framework to study the problem of the monetary
policy transparency. In this framework, we identify two sources of uncertainty: the
uncertainty about the central bank preferences (central bank’s opacity or trans-
parency) and the model uncertainty concerning the true structure of the economy.
In this context, it is particularly important to give an answer to the question whether
model uncertainty aﬀects the transparency of monetary policy as well as the welfare
and the macroeconomic performance.
In this environment, we show that robustness or ”uncertainty aversion” reveals
the possibility of a precautionary behaviour of the central bank in the case of poten-
tial speciﬁcation errors surrounding the model, reducing thus central bank’s willing-
ness to choice a high degree of monetary policy transparency. More precisely, there
appears that the limits within which the central bank may assign diﬀerent values in
preference uncertainty enlarge with the increase in the degree of model robustness,
meaning that central bank’s monetary policy may potentially be less transparent.
On the other hand, we show also that the more the central bank’s opacity is
important, the higher the inﬂation expectations, the inﬂation, the output gap and
their volatility will be important. These results reveal that a larger degree of central
bank opacity requires that central bank will act more aggressively, generating thus
a better economic stability performance. Finally, we show that the central bank ex-
pected loss is aﬀected by two underlying sources of uncertainty. For any given degree
of central bank transparency, central bank can always beneﬁt from the improvement
of the model robustness improving thus the macroeconomic performances.
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